UIC
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

NCAA DOWN FOR THE COUNT? NEW STATE LEGISLATION THREATENS
COLLEGIATE SPORTS AS WE KNOW IT
JOE NELSON
ABSTRACT
Since the 1950s, the NCAA’s amateurism shield has served as a stalwart protector in
combatting litigation from athletes and coaches within its purview. They have faced
many lawsuits since that time, with the overwhelming majority failing. As this
comment shows, complaints have been of a wide variety such as antitrust,
employment, and state action litigation. The amateurism principle was their defense
in each of those situations. But now, many states have recently begun passing
legislation that would allow student athletes to obtain compensation, in more ways
than one. These statutes are a shot through the heart of the amateurism principle,
leaving the NCAA’s authority hanging on by a thread. This comment will analyze the
fall out from the proposed statutes and the consequences that will result. It will look
at possible options in resolving this dispute and ultimately will come to a conclusion
on the best possible resolution for both parties.
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NCAA DOWN FOR THE COUNT? NEW STATE LEGISLATION THREATENS
COLLEGIATE SPORTS AS WE KNOW IT
JOE NELSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will focus on the development of the NCAA and its procedures with
an emphasis on the effect of these procedures on student-athletes and how new
legislation may change that. Further, this comment will aim to answer the looming
question the NCAA is currently attempting to resolve: what is the best way to allow
compensation for student-athletes? It seems like a very simple question, but the
history and background of the organization that this comment provides will show the
reader that it really is not as simple as it sounds. Part I of the of the comment gives an
example of a former NCAA student-athlete and highlights how college sports impacted
his life. Part II provides the storied history of the NCAA and walks the reader through
how it got to where it is today, and more importantly, how its amateurism concept
became the shield it is now. Part III discusses in depth the many proposed resolutions
to the above question, that is, how to compensate student-athletes. Part IV goes
through each of those same resolutions and states why or why not they are a feasible
option and finishes with which resolution is likely the best as well as most-probable to
occur.
A. Protection from Commercial Exploitation?
The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) most fundamental
principle is the idea of amateurism.1 Their by-laws maintain that this principle is for
the athletes’ protection “from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.”2 Ironically, the NCAA has been challenged for years for doing just that—
exploitation. The NCAA has been able to use the ideologies of “student-athletes” and

*
© Joe Nelson 2020. Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School, B.S.
in Marketing, Carthage College (2018).
1 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL § 2.9 (Aug. 2019) (“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.”).
2 NCAA, supra note 1.
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“amateurism” as its shield for quite some time.3 Many states are now attempting to
stand up to the NCAA, in defense of the athletes and their interests.4
In 2009, Kyle Hardrick established himself as a top basketball prospect.5 He
played for one of the best high school travel teams in the nation, with many athletes
from these teams now playing professionally.6 Kyle worked endlessly to achieve his
lifelong dream of playing professionally. He stated, “[c]ause that’s what I wanna do
when I grow up—I wanna pay for my family, so they don’t have to work anymore . . . .”7
Kyle committed to play at The University of Oklahoma at age fourteen.8 His mother
was relieved when his new coach told her “[h]ey, we're gonna take care of your son.”9
At a practice his freshman year, his teammate Keith Gallon fell on Kyle’s leg and
injured his knee.10 Kyle stated, “I remember the trainers and the managers were like,
‘Oh, god. what happened?’ Sound like a shotgun.”11 He was informed that the injury
was not serious.12 The coaches made Kyle continue doing drills and practice through
the pain.13 When the pain never subsided, his mother took him to see a family doctor.14
The results of the test showed a torn meniscus.15 Kyle had the surgery to repair his
knee, but there was permanent damage.16 The doctor said, “if this would’ve been taken
care of a year ago, he wouldn’t have been in this situation he’s in.”17
Interestingly, the university disputed the finding of the torn meniscus and would
not pay for the surgery.18 Kyle had to pay for the surgery with his family’s insurance.19
To make matters even worse, that summer Kyle learned he was losing his
scholarship.20 Kyle attempted to transfer to continue playing basketball, but the pain

3 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006) (“The NCAA purposely created the term
‘student-athlete’ as propaganda, solely to obscure the reality of the university-athlete employment
relationship and to avoid universities’ legal responsibilities as employers.”).
4 Charlotte Carol, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fair-play-imagelikeness-laws. To date, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New
York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina have all either adopted legislation, proposed legislation, or
circulated a bill for proposal. These pieces of legislation would serve to provide NCAA athletes
protections in order to allow them to attain some form of compensation.
5 Martin Kessler, Power And The NCAA: One Athlete's Fall From The Big 12 To The Oil Fields,
WBUR (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2017/1 0/13/kyle-hardrick-story-ncaa-show.
6 Kessler, supra note 5.
7 THE BUSINESS OF AMATEURS (Gravitas Ventures 2016).
8 Ben Strauss, A Fight to Keep College Athletes From the Pain of Injury Costs, N. Y. TIMES (Apr.
25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/sports/a-fight-to-keep-college-athletes-from-the-painof-injury-costs.html.
9 See Kessler, supra note 5.
10 See Strauss, supra note 8.
11 See Kessler, supra note 5.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Kessler, supra note 5.
18 See Strauss, supra note 8.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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in his knee worsened until he needed another surgery.21 He decided this was the end
of his basketball career.22 In 2012, in the midst of endless pain and overwhelming
medical costs, with no scholarship, Kyle dropped out of college.23
Where is Kyle now? He works twelve-hour shifts in the oil fields in Texas.24 His
mother worries about his depression.25 She stated that “‘[i]t’s a system of college sports.
You put trust in these universities. You trust them with your kid on and off the court,
and once you’re damaged good, they just kick you to the curb.’”26 While Kyle continues
to toil over 12 hour shifts in the oil fields, the University and the NCAA continue to
line their pockets.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Establishment of the NCAA
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt was concerned with the state of
intercollegiate football and the violence involved.27 He wanted to make sure the game
had appropriate regulations for player safety while maintaining the notion of
amateurism.28 Therefore, Roosevelt called leaders from major universities like
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to meet with him and discuss a resolution.29 They
collectively decided that in order for college sports to continue, there must be some

See Kessler, supra note 5.
Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. ([She] “wake[s] up in the middle of the night dreaming that [she] walk[s] in the door and
he’s hanging or he shot himself, because he’s that depressed”).
26 Id.; see also Terry Collins, Will Paying Student Athletes Save College Sports—or Kill the
NCAA?, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2019, 10:30 AM) https://fortune.com/2019/10/08/ncaa-paying-athletescalifornia-fair-pay-play-law/ (California Governor Gavin Newsom, who approved the Fair Pay to Play
Act, agrees because he “think[s] too many athletes . . . have given up everything, body, and mind in
some cases, for a sport that they love and they were let down”).
27 James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 12
(1985).
28 Koch discusses the founding of the NCAA and states the following:
The NCAA was founded in 1906 as a consequence of the efforts of President
Theodore Roosevelt and others to reduce the unsavory violence and mayhem that
characterized intercollegiate football contests at the time. An additional concern of
Roosevelt and others was the preservation of amateurism. One means of doing that
was to define athlete eligibility; another was to develop common rules for
conducting games and competition. These rules were used by the NCAA when it
began to sponsor regional and national championships in a growing number of
sports.
Koch, supra note 27, at 12.
29 Taylor
Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/.
21
22
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reform.30 In 1906, representatives from sixty-eight schools founded what would come
to be known as the NCAA to solve these problems.31
Before the establishment of the NCAA, most of the intercollegiate athletics that
took place were controlled by the students.32 This is likely why the NCAA played less
of a role and held minimal control at the beginning.33 In 1929, a report by the Carnegie
Foundation found that “[c]ommercialism in college athletics must be diminished and
college sport must rise to a point where it is esteemed primarily and sincerely for the
opportunities it affords to mature youth . . . . ”34 Slowly, over time, the NCAA
continued to adopt this belief and gained more and more control over college athletics.
B. Television Rights
In the early days, one of the main reasons for the NCAA’s acquisition of control
was a new technology—the television.35 “The combination of adverse public
attention . . . and the desire of most NCAA members to limit the effects of television
upon their gate attendance led to dramatic increases in the power and control of the
central NCAA organization.”36 In 1951, the NCAA decided to ban televised games,
other than ones of their choosing.37 A year later, it was able to negotiate their first
television contract for college football, worth approximately $1,140,000.38 The NCAA
was able to negotiate restrictions so that it had essentially complete control over which
teams received television exposure.39 With this, it “had secured enough power and
money to regulate all of college sports.”40 As televisions became more commonplace,
the NCAA’s television revenues increased and, consequently, so did its power.41
Indeed, until 1984, it earned over $65,000,000 negotiating the broadcasting rights for
football alone.42

Branch, supra note 29.
Id. (“At Roosevelt’s behest, the three schools issued a public statement that college sports must
reform to survive, and representatives from 68 colleges founded a new organization that would soon
be called the National Collegiate Athletic Association.”).
32 HOWARD J. SALVAGE, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 22 (The Merrymount Press, 1929)
(“During most of what we have called the second period of American college athletics, the direction
and management of sports and games rested, in general, with the undergraduates.”).
33 Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 Ind. L.J. 985, 991 (1987) (“The actual governance and running of
intercollegiate athletic events remained largely in the hands of the students until after World War
I.”).
34 See SALVAGE, supra note 32, at 310.
35 See Koch, supra note 27, at 13 (“Simultaneously, a new technological innovation, television,
threatened to alter the intercollegiate athletic landscape even further.”).
36 Id.
37 See Branch, supra note 29.
38 See Smith, supra note 33, at 993; see also Branch, supra note 29 (“On June 6, 1952, NBC signed
a one-year deal to pay the NCAA $1.14 million for a carefully restricted football package.”).
39 See Branch, supra note 29
40 Id.
41 Id. See also Koch, supra note 27, at 14 (“These television rights turned out to be a gold mine for
the NCAA.”).
42 See Koch, supra note 27, at 14.
30
31
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In the midst of the NCAA solidifying their control over television rights, “a threat
arose that garnered universal support by the member universities for increased power
to the NCAA and the ‘tradition’ of amateurism in college sports.”43 The threat was the
potential for the state to identify NCAA athletes as employees.44 In response, the
NCAA “crafted the term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules
and interpretations as a mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes.”45
By instilling this “student-athlete” persona to promote their ideal of amateurism, it
provided them a way to avoid the identification of their athletes as employees.46
“[T]he NCAA rose to power, and the ‘revered tradition’ of amateurism was restyled
with a spoonful of sugar to help the public—the consumers of college sports—swallow
it.”47
The NCAA has managed to avoid the threat of athletes-as-employees for the time
being, but today the NCAA faces a new challenge—athletic endorsements.48 These
endorsements threaten to diminish the NCAA’s vital amateurism ideology. Yet it is
different because it does not necessarily require the NCAA or their schools to have to
pay. In particular, California is preparing to enact legislation that allows athletes to
seek their own pay.49 California Governor Gavin Newsom made the final decision to
pass the Fair Pay to Play Act. Newsom stated that “‘if the athletic association stands
its ground and threatens to pull its access to schools in states seeking fair pay to play,
its 113—year reputation—and its existence—will be on the line.’”50 He continued, “‘I
think they will lose the public opinion and, ultimately, their moral authority will wane
as well as their formal authority and the whole system will collapse.’”51 The whole
system collapsing may seem far-fetched, but the point still rings true. Endorsement
compensation is a viable and highly sought-after remedy.52
43 Kelly Charles Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition, 28 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV 181, 191 (2017).
44 Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 213, 215
(2004) (“That threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees by
state industrial commissions and the courts.”).
45 Id.; see Crabb, supra note 43, at 191.
46 Crabb, supra note 43, at 192 (“[W]ith the . . . money flowing to support this commercial
enterprise, the NCAA's promotion of the ‘student-athlete’ and the ‘Principle of Amateurism,’ as a
protection against the purported evils of professionalism, proved to be a convenient way for
the NCAA and its member universities to escape the ‘employee’ label for college players.”).
47 Id.
48 See Collins, supra note 26 (“Ohio freshman Congressman Anthony Gonzalez, a Republican and
former NFL and star wide receiver at Ohio State University, has one suggestion on how to level the
playing field. Gonzalez is proposing a federal law to give college athletes nationwide a chance to make
endorsement money.”).
49 Tom Goldman, College Athletes In California Can Now Be Paid Under Fair Pay To Play Act,
NPR (Sep. 30, 2019, 5:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/30/765834549/college-athletes-incalifornia-can-now-be-paid-under-fair-pay-to-play-act (“The law will allow California student athletes
to earn money from endorsements, sponsorship deals and other activities related to their athletic skill.
They'll be able to hire agents.”).
50 See Collins, supra note 26.
51 Id.
52 Andrew Atterbury & Mackenzie Mays, How states forced the NCAA’s hand on student athlete
endorsements,
POLITICO
(Oct.
29,
2019,
7:57
PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2019/10/29/how-states-forced-the-ncaas-hand-onstudent-athlete-endorsements-1226080 (California Senator Nancy Skinner, the woman who authored
the Fair Pay to Play legislation, stated that “[w]hether you come from the fact that this has been an
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After overcoming the athletes-as-employees issue, the NCAA re-established its
power. However, there is still one issue it continues deal with: keeping its colleges and
universities happy.53 In 1973, the NCAA divided their member schools into three
divisions: division one, division two, and division three.54 “Ostensibly, this effort at
federation was conceived as a means of enhancing enforcement by placing institutions
of similar size in the same division and for the purpose of maintaining a similar level
of competitiveness among member schools in a given division.”55 It also created a new
policy calling for punishment when necessary to enforce their rules.56 This new policy
allowed it to punish schools directly, so it also indirectly was able to punish
administrators, coaches, and student athletes.57 Of course, this new enforcement and
regulation did not come without criticism.58 This was also one of the first times there
was concern that the NCAA had wrongly transformed college athletics into a
commercial enterprise, rather than just an additional benefit of the educational
system.59
As tensions continued to rise, many of the bigger institutions began to wonder
why they even needed the NCAA to play this controlling role.60 This sparked further
controversy and, in 1981, the NCAA faced their biggest challenge to date. Sixty-one of
their greatest football member-schools threatened to negotiate their own television
contracts with NBC.61 The NCAA attempted to threaten sanctions if the institutions
did not comply, but the effort was futile.62 That is because two universities, the
University of Georgia and the University of Oklahoma, responded with an antitrust
lawsuit.63

exploitation of black athletes or come at it from that it’s just a violation of every free-market
principle . . . it’s a change that was so ripe for right now.”).
53 See Branch, supra note 29 (“The NCAA’s control of college sports still rested on a fragile base,
however: the consent of the colleges and universities it governed.”).
54 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Smith, supra note 33, at
993 (“The early seventies witnessed the divisionalizing of college athletics.”).
55 See Smith, supra note 33, at 993.
56 See Koch, supra note 27, at 14 (“[T]he NCAA undertook punitive actions that often carried with
them significant financial penalties in order to enforce its rules”).
57 See Smith, supra note 33, at 994.
58 Id. at 993 (“[M]embers were beginning to voice concerns regarding alleged unfairness in the
rules and the enforcement process”).
59 Id. at 994 (“[C]riticism surfaced anew asserting that intercollegiate athletics had been
commercialized to the point that it was little more than a big business masquerading as an educational
enterprise.”); see also Branch, supra note 29 (“[R]eformers fretted that commercialism was hurting
college sports, and that higher education’s historical balance between academics and athletics had
been distorted by all the money sloshing around.”).
60 See Branch, supra note 29 (“Why do we need to have our television coverage brokered through
the NCAA? Couldn’t we get a bigger cut of that TV money by dealing directly with the networks?”).
61 Id. (“Calling the NCAA a price-fixing cartel that siphoned every television dollar through its
coffers, in 1981 a rogue consortium of 61 major football schools threatened to sign an independent
contract with NBC for $180 million over four years.”).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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C. Antitrust Litigation
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,64 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the NCAA’s television
plan violated the Sherman Act.65 The Court held that the “the NCAA television plan
on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market . . . .”66 The Court
continued, however, that “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the
‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”67
Luckily for the NCAA, it had an influx of money from basketball in recent years,
otherwise, it may have been incapable of recovering from its loss of football revenue.68
In fact, the year of the Board of Regents decision, the NCAA earned over $31,000,000
from selling television rights to its Division one men’s championship game alone.69
That financial support has not ceased either. In 2017, the March Madness Tournament
brought in over $1,000,000,000.70 It has had similar numbers in years prior as well.
Although the Board of Regents decision was a setback, the NCAA maintained its
strength. Its next big legal challenge was not until 1988 in Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n
v. Tarkanian.71 Although this case did not involve an antitrust issue, it still provided
a holding that remains relevant today. Leading up to the case, the NCAA placed
University of Nevada Las Vegas’s (“UNLV”) basketball team on probation for two
years.72 It found thirty-eight NCAA violations, ten of which involved Tarkanian.73 It
told the school they must “show cause why the NCAA should not impose further
penalties unless UNLV severed all ties during the probation between its intercollegiate
athletic program and Tarkanian,” their current head coach.74 Tarkanian sued the
university and the NCAA under 42 U.S.C. § 198375 alleging a violation of his

468 U.S. 85, 85-136 (1984).
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2.).
66 Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. at 113.
67 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
68 See Branch, supra note 29 (“A few years earlier, this blow might have financially crippled the
NCAA—but a rising tide of money from basketball concealed the structural damage of the Regents
decision.”).
69 See Koch, supra note 27, at 14 (“In the 1984-1985 academic year, for example, the NCAA
expected to earn over $31 million solely from selling the rights to televise its Division I men’s
basketball championship.”).
70 Marc Edelman, College Basketball Players Get None Of The NCAA Tournament Revenue — Is
It
Time
To
Unionize?,
FORBES
(Mar.
18,
2018,
11:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2018/03/18/college-basketball-players-get-none-of-thencaa-tournaments-revenues-is-it-time-to-unionize/#6191ace85b47
(“Last
year,
the
tournament produced more than $1 billion in revenue.”).
71 488 U.S. 179, 179-203 (1988).
72 Id. at 181.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 The statutory provision that provides for a civil action for deprivation of rights states the
following:
64
65
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Fourteenth Amendment76 due process rights.77 Reversing a Nevada Supreme Court
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the NCAA was not a
state actor under 42 U.S.C § 1983.78 This seemingly minor ruling holds great weight.
By determining the NCAA was not a state actor, this allows the NCAA to not follow
constitutional requirements.79 “By ignoring the interdependencies of money and power
between the Association and public universities, the Court has shielded
the NCAA from judicial review and left the liberty and property interests of college
athletes and coaches unprotected.”80
Another antitrust case came later that same year. In McCormack v. National
Collegiate Athletic Asso.,81 “[t]he NCAA found that Southern Methodist University
[(“SMU”)] had violated its rules limiting compensation for football players to
scholarships with limited financial benefits.”82 In response, the NCAA suspended their
program.83 SMU alumni, football players, and cheerleaders challenged the suspension
as violating the Sherman Act for creating rules that restrict benefits for the players.84
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
76 The Fourteenth Amendment states the following:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77 488 U.S. 179, 181 (1988).
78 Id. at 199 (“It would be more appropriate to conclude that UNLV has conducted its athletic
program under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies were
developed and enforced under color of Nevada law.”).
79 Terri Peretti, What If the NCAA Was a State Actor? Here, There, and Beyond, 20 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 292 (“In 1988, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (‘NCAA’) was not a state actor and, thus, did not
have to abide by constitutional requirements, such as due process of law.”).
80 Id.
81 845 F.2d 1338, 1338-1347 (5th Cir. 1988).
82 Id. at 1340.
83 Id. (“It accordingly suspended the SMU football program for the entire 1987 season and
imposed restrictions on it for the 1988 season.”).
84 The Fifth Circuit laid out the general facts of the case as follows:
A group of SMU alumni, football players, and cheerleaders challenges that action,
contending that the NCAA violated the antitrust and civil rights laws by
promulgating and enforcing rules restricting the benefits that may be awarded
student athletes . . . . The complaint, as amended, charges antitrust violations in
that (1) the restrictions on compensation to football players constitute illegal price-
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The Fifth Circuit held that the NCAA’s rules reasonably serve their purpose of
maintaining the dichotomy between professional and collegiate sports.85
The next antitrust challenge came in 1998 in Law v. NCAA.86 In an effort to reduce
cost, the NCAA created the “restricted-earnings coach” position on collegiate
basketball staffs, thereby replacing the role of part-time assistants or graduate
assistants.87 It capped the restricted-earnings coaches salary at $16,000.88 The
plaintiffs in the case were restricted-earnings coaches that challenged the rule’s salary
cap as violating the Sherman Act.89 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the restrictedearnings salary cap violated antitrust law.90

fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and (2) the suspension of SMU constitutes a
group boycott by other NCAA members.

Id.
In discussing the role of the NCAA, the Fifth Circuit stated the following:
The NCAA markets college football as a product distinct from professional football.
The eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of
commercializing pressures. The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with
academics. Its requirements reasonably further this goal . . . [T]he plaintiffs still
produce only two allegations to support their claim that the NCAA’s rules are
designed to stifle competition: that the NCAA permits some compensation through
scholarships and allows a student to be a professional in one sport and an amateur
in another. Accepting these facts as true, however, they do not undermine the
rationality of the eligibility requirements. That the NCAA has not distilled
amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts to maintain a mixture
containing some amateur elements are unreasonable. We therefore conclude that
the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts that would carry their antitrust claim
and that the motion to dismiss was properly granted.
Id. at 1344-1345.
86 134 F.3d 1010, 1010-1024 (10th Cir. 1998).
87 Id. at 1013 (“The Committee proposed an array of recommendations to amend the NCAA’s
bylaws, including proposed Bylaw 11.6.4 that would limit Division I basketball coaching staffs to four
members—one head coach, two assistant coaches, and one entry-level coach called a ‘restrictedearnings coach.’” That “category was created to replace the positions of part-time assistant, graduate
assistant, and volunteer coach.”).
88 Id. at 1014.
89 Id. at 1015 (“In this case, plaintiffs-appellees were restricted-earnings men’s basketball coaches
at NCAA Division I institutions in the academic year 1992-93. They challenged the REC Rule’s
limitation on compensation under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990), as an
unlawful ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.’”).
90 Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Ann M. Mayo, Issues in Antitrust, the NCAA, and Sports Management,
10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 69, 84 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order granting a
permanent injunction barring the NCAA from reenacting compensation limits as those contained in
the ‘restricted earnings’ rule.”).
85
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III. ANALYSIS

A. State Action
The key case in this section is Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n v. Tarkanian.91 The
Supreme Court in this case determined the NCAA was not a state actor and thus, it
has not been subject to constitutional requirements since.92 In contrast, many circuit
courts have maintained that high school athletic associations are state actors.93
Indeed, the Supreme Court did too in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association.94 The somewhat obscure reason provided by Justice Souter
in Brentwood is that all of the high school athletic association’s member schools are
within a single state, while NCAA’s member schools are across many states.95 Sure,
the argument seems plausible on its face. But in current times, when essentially all
the member schools defer to NCAA rule and allow it to discipline athletes, coaches, and
programs on their own, isn’t it really the one creating the rules and taking action to
enforce them? In Tarkanian, UNLV was the one that fired Coach Tarkanian. However,
the NCAA had already placed the school on probation for two years and was going to
punish them further unless they fired him. Was this really the school’s action? The
reasoning is hard to align. For these reasons, it is difficult to review these cases and
determine why they should be resolved differently, which is why many people think
the NCAA should be considered a state actor.
In light of the decision in Brentwood, it is not wholly implausible that
Tarkanian can be reversed.96 All of the necessary doctrines and rules are in place, they
just need to be followed.97 This would eventually force the NCAA to make changes to
their current practices and policies, causing a major rift in their business. If the NCAA
were deemed to be a state actor, essentially everything it does would be subject to
judicial review.98 “State actor status for the NCAA brings judges into its investigatory
and enforcement processes and alters the power relationships among the key
players.”99 The judges would be able to “assess the substantive and procedural fairness
488 U.S. 179, 179-99 (1988).
See Peretti, supra note 79, at 292.
93 See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1126-32 (9th Cir. 1982); Griffin
High School v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 671-76 (7th Cir. 1987); see also A.H. v. Illinois High
School Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (directly discussing Griffin High School, the
court stated that “[a]lthough the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the application of Title II to a
high school athletic association, it has held that IHSA is a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983”).
94 531 U.S. 288, 290-305 (2001).
95 Id. at 298.
96 See Peretti, supra note 79, at 303 (“[T]he Court’s reasoning in the latter case [Brentwood]
provides an opening for reformers seeking to subject the NCAA’s policies and activities to judicial
review.”).
97 Id. at 317 (“Brentwood Academy and its corresponding scholarly commentary make clear that
reversing Tarkanian would not require the Court to invent a new doctrine or discard an entire line of
precedents and doctrinal rules.”).
98 Id. at 332 (“Reversing Tarkanian opens the door to judicial oversight of the NCAA.”).
99 Id.
91
92
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of NCAA policies and practices and protect the liberty and property interests of college
athletes, coaches, and member institutions.”100
B. Athletes as Employees
Walter Byers, former NCAA Executive Director and the man who essentially
created the NCAA amateurism ideal, once stated, “[a]mateurism is not a moral issue;
it is an economic camouflage for monopoly practice.”101 Thankfully, however, “[t]he
myth of amateurism is on the verge of being eliminated.”102 One facially reasonable
response in discussion of NCAA exploitation is to simply call for the NCAA to treat the
athletes as employees and pay them wages.
One clear benefit of labeling student athletes as employees is that the athletes
would then be entitled to coverage under worker’s compensation law. The NCAA would
be obligated to comply with state laws regarding pay, overtime, and worker’s
compensation.103 As previously stated, that is one of the reasons the NCAA designated
the term student-athlete in the first place.104 Surely Kyle Hardrick105 (and many
others)106 would appreciate having this source of recourse when their lives and dreams
were completely ruined while playing for the organization. The overtime requirement
would help as well. Currently, NCAA rules only allow an athlete to spend twenty hours
per week on their sport.107 However, the Pac-12, an NCAA conference made up of
twelve schools, performed a study on nine of their member schools to determine how
long athletes were truly spending on their sport.108 The study found that 409 of their

Id.
Warren Zola, NCAA Amateurism Is an Illusion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 1, 2013,
5:48 PM), https://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-ncaa-athletes-be-paid/ncaa-amateurism-is-anIllusion#targetText=Former%20NCAA%20Executive%20Director%20Walter,the%20existing%20coll
usive%20wage%20fixing.
102 See Crabb, supra note 43, at 181.
103 Id. at 191 (“The threat was that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees by the state,
the result of which would mean that the universities would become subject to the state labor rules
respecting wages, overtime, and workers compensation.”).
104 See Wheeler, supra note 44, at 228 (“One example is accident insurance. This is what led Wally
Byers and company to anoint the concept of student athlete, and it has been a lament of injured college
athletes ever since.” One example of an injured college athlete is “Kent Waldrep[,] the running back
whose football accident three decades ago while competing for TCU turned him into a paraplegic, but
who was not eligible as a student athlete for coverage under state worker’s compensation law.”); see
supra text accompanying note 3.
105 See Kessler, supra note 5.
106 Kristina Peterson, College Athletes Stuck With The Bill After Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/sports/16athletes.html (“Still, many athletes are not so
lucky—victims to disagreements over who is responsible for payment or what constitutes a medical
condition.”).
107 Dennis Dodd, Pac-12 study reveals athletes 'too exhausted to study effectively', CBS SPORTS
(Apr. 21, 2015, 5:05 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/pac-12-study-revealsathletes-too-exhausted-to-study-effectively/ (“NCAA rules restrict athletes’ time spent on their
particular sport to 20 hours per week.”).
108 Id.
100
101
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“athletes spend an average of 50 hours per week on their sport and are often ‘too
exhausted to study effectively . . . .’”109
Regardless of whether it should be resolved this way or not, even proponents of
the idea find it to be a tough resolution. Considering the NCAA’s most paramount ideal
is amateurism, it is easy to understand why people believe this option to be unsuitable.
C. Endorsement Compensation
The NCAA knows that change needs to be made which is why it formed a working
group to discuss potential solutions.110 It formed the group in the face of the
overwhelming pressure state legislatures continue to impose with potential legislation
that would allow athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness.111 There are
little details about the type of resolution the group is considering, but Big 12
commissioner Bob Bowlsby stated that they “are coalescing on a set of principles that
adhere as close to the collegiate model as possible.”112
Thus, it is evident that the amateurism ideal is not going to be relinquished just
yet. Whatever change the NCAA makes, it still is going to maintain the amateurism
and professionalism divide. Therefore, it is likely that the NCAA allows for some sort
of profit off the athlete’s names, images, and likenesses, but that the organization
regulates it.113 If the NCAA were to allow endorsement opportunities without
regulation the system simply would be a free-for-all and its amateurism policies would
essentially fade into nothingness.
Additionally, in the digital age, there are countless opportunities to increase one’s
notoriety and receive financial gain. In fact, one student athlete from University of
Central Florida, Donald De La Haye, had his own YouTube channel where he received
advertising revenue.114 However, he had to give up his side business when the NCAA
ruled him ineligible because of it.115 One possible endorsement compensation model for
consideration is the Olympic Endorsement Model.
109 Id.; see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 100 (“The fifty-three hours required
each week for football, of course, is in addition to class time, study time, and ten hours per week of
mandatory study hall time in academic-support facilities.”).
110 Dan Murphy, NCAA to meet Tuesday to consider allowing athletes to profit from endorsements,
ESPN (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27952245/ncaa-meet-tuesdayconsider-allowing-athletes-profit-endorsements (“The NCAA’s top decision-makers will meet Tuesday
in Atlanta for their first formal discussion about modifying rules that currently prohibit college
athletes from making money by selling the rights to their names, images or likenesses.”).
111 Id. (“The association’s long-held policy regarding that aspect of amateurism is under
increasing pressure from state and federal legislators who believe college athletes deserve an
opportunity to collect money from endorsements.”).
112 See Dodd, supra note 107.
113 See Murphy, supra note 110 (“That would likely mean regulating potential endorsement deals
in some fashion, which sets up a battle between those who wish to see an unrestricted market for
college athlete endorsement deals and others who believe some degree of oversight is necessary.”).
114 Dan Gartland, UCF Kicker Ruled Ineligible After YouTube Channel Gets Him in Trouble with
NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2017), https://www.si.com/college/2017/07/31/ucf-kickerdonald-de-la-haye-ineligible-ncaa-youtube-videos (“De La Haye, a junior kickoff specialist, has a
YouTube channel with over 90,000 subscribers that has amassed nearly five million total views.”).
115 Id. (“UCF kicker Donald De La Haye has been ruled ineligible after he refused to give in to
the NCAA’s demand for him to stop monetizing his popular YouTube channel.”).
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1. Olympic Endorsement Model
Although the NCAA would like to avoid it,116 one of the better options for
regulation is to follow the Olympic Model.117 This model is practical for many reasons.
The first being that it still allows the NCAA to maintain oversight over the endeavor,
which it clearly desires to have. Another is that it is already an established model that
it can implement without the arduous process of coming up with a plan. Furthermore,
it is already proven to be successful. And finally, the transition should be seamless,
considering the NCAA and Olympic programs are already very similar.118 In fact, the
NCAA already allows its student-athletes to receive compensation for their
performance in the Olympic games.119 “Athletes [including NCAA student-athletes]
competing for their country are free to collect prize money from specific donors.”120 An
example of this would be Katie Ledecky. She swam for Stanford after earning more
than $100,000 from the USOC in Rio.”121 Meanwhile, however, “[a]thletes responsible
for bringing massive revenue to their schools are barred from receiving any money
beyond their scholarship and a small stipend.”122 Indeed, there are differences between
Olympic reward programs and paying a student-athlete for their individual
accomplishment. However, the point still stands that “money for athletic performance
is money for athletic performance, regardless of where it comes from or when the
performance takes place.”123 Therefore, many people wonder: why maintain this
arbitrary discrepancy?124

116 See Dodd, supra note 107 (“We ought to look at things in light of modern circumstances. But
we also believe the collegiate model has certain components to it that’s not appropriate to compare it
to the Olympic model, and it's not appropriate to compare it to professional sports.”).
117 Id. (The “‘[o]lympic model’ gives athletes the opportunity to profit off their notoriety in order
to earn money for such things as training.”).
118 Dionne Koller, Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 733 (2016)
(“Outside of the realm of professional sports, although sometimes overlapping, are Olympic and
intercollegiate sports.”); see also Josephine R. Potuto & Matthew J. Mitten, Comparing NCAA and
Olympic Athlete Eligibility Dispute Resolution Systems in Light of Procedural Fairness and
Substantive Justice, 7 HARV. J. OF SPORTS & ENT. LAW 1, 3-4 (2016) (“For more than 100 years the
National Collegiate Athletic Association . . . and the International Olympic Committee . . . in
combination with the United States Olympic Committee . . . , which all are private associations,
respectively have regulated ‘amateur’ athletic competition within the United States and
internationally.”).
119 Adam Kilgore, College athletes can’t be paid for their performances — unless they’re Olympians,
WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/college-athletescant-be-paid-for-their-performances--unless-theyre-olympians/2016/09/02/45ae7c36-7123-11e6-8365b19e428a975e_story.html (Kyle Snyder, an American wrestler who participated in the Brazil
Olympics, went directly back to Columbus, Ohio from Brazil “to begin his junior year at Ohio State,
diving headlong into classwork he missed. In the winter and spring, he plans to defend his NCAA
national championship, wrestling again for the Buckeyes after accepting that $250,000 from an
outside organization—all within the parameters of NCAA rules.”).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (“Last week, several Olympic-medal winners returned to campus just as college football
season was set to open, and the monetary rewards they reaped from their accomplishments highlight
a contrast between how the NCAA views them and the players filling those stadiums.”).
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The NCAA maintains authority over intercollegiate sports and the International
Olympic Committee (“IOC”), while the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”)
maintains authority over Olympic sports.125 They each create rules based on their
policies and enforce compliance with them.126 However, the IOC also allows athletes to
maintain sponsorship deals pursuant to their rules.127 Following this model would
allow individual athletes an opportunity to seek their own form of compensation,
letting the NCAA off the hook in terms of having to pay athletes out of its own pocket.128
“Colleges, most of whom lose money on athletics, would not be responsible for paying
players directly, yet college athletes whose skills command millions in the free market
are able to profit while in college.”129
Although the NCAA wants to avoid making any change; that will not work any
longer. Therefore, they should do their best to come to some sort of happy medium for
the two sides. For the NCAA that would mean giving up as little ground as possible.
For the athletes that means gaining as much as they can. Surely the athletes would be
willing to agree to a model that would allow them to earn money outside of their sport,
something they have not been able to do since the inception of amateurism. This type
of resolution could be a solid middle ground that would benefit both parties. The NCAA
will argue that this hurts its amateurism and professionalism divide. However, it is
debatable if that will be a successful argument for much longer.

125 See Potuto & Mitten, supra note 120, at 4 (“The NCAA exercises plenary governing authority
over intercollegiate athletic competition in the United States, while the IOC exercises plenary
governing authority over Olympic sports competition worldwide and the USOC does so nationally.”).
126 Id. (“These governing bodies adopt and enforce their respective rules defining and regulating
the eligibility of Olympic sport and NCAA athletes to compete, including anti-doping rules designed
to safeguard the health and safety of participating athletes as well as the integrity of athletic
competition.”).
127 Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation And The Future Of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77, 110 (2013) (“Another
alternative to the pay-for-play system is amending NCAA rules to allow student-athletes to accept
individual sponsorship deals similar to the Olympic model used in international sports.”); see also
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER Rule 40 (Rev. 26, June 2019)
(“Competitors, team officials and other team personnel who participate in the Olympic Games may
allow their person, name, picture or sports performances to be used for advertising purposes during
the Olympic Games in accordance with the principles determined by the IOC Executive Board.”). See
also Nicholas Piotrowicz, Can the Olympic Model Fix the NCAA, THE BLADE (Mar. 31, 2018, 10:20
AM),
https://www.toledoblade.com/College/2018/03/31/Can-the-Olympic-model-fix-the-NCAA.html
(“U.S. swimming champion Michael Phelps, for instance, signed a deal with Under Armour, while gold
medal gymnast Gabby Douglas became a brand ambassador for Gillette’s Venus razors ahead of the
2016 Summer Games.”).
128 See Weston, supra note 129, at 110 (“The NCAA would not be paying the athletes and would
thereby avoid an employer-employee relationship; however, the best players—the Johnny Manziels—
would be rewarded in the open market, potentially allowing elite, popular players to rival the salaries
of their professional counterparts.”).
129 See Branch, supra note 29.
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IV. PROPOSAL

A. State Action
Subjecting the NCAA to constitutional requirements would likely solve many
issues. It is a reasonable potential solution to a very complex issue. However, of all the
potential resolutions, it seems the least attainable.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Nat'l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n v. Tarkanian,130 which
is the only thing preventing the NCAA from being categorized as a state actor, is
simply flawed. “Given that the purpose, structure, and operations of the NCAA and
high school athletic associations are similar, and public-school members are critically
involved in both associations, there is no convincing basis to distinguish between high
school athletic associations and the NCAA for state actor purposes.”131 Federal circuits
have long held that high school athletic associations are state actors.132 The Supreme
Court even followed suit, deciding in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association that a high school athletic association is a state actor.133
There, the Court returned itself to its proper, more functionalist134 approach to state
action.135 It is for this reason, and others, that many people call for the reversal of
Tarkanian.136 “The dichotomy created by Tarkanian and Brentwood between the
NCAA and a high school athletic association is unsustainable.”137
Many believe that this change would be an appropriate way to fix the inequity138
within the collegiate system. Although this solution would be insufficient from a
488 U.S. 179, 179-99 (1988).
Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The Entwinement and
Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
OF SPORT 243, 245 (2008); see also Koller, supra note 120, at 733 (“Intercollegiate and interscholastic
sports programs also enjoy considerable insulation from government regulation, despite the fact that
nearly all of them, whether in public or private schools, are recipients of government funding.”).
132 See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1126-32 (9th Cir. 1982); Griffin
High School v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 671-76 (7th Cir. 1987); see also A.H. v. Illinois High
School Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 3d 705, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (directly discussing Griffin High School, the
court stated that “[a]lthough the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the application of Title II to a
high school athletic association, it has held that IHSA is a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.”).
133 531 U.S. 288, 288-305 (2001).
134 William N. Eskridge Jr., Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation
of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998) (“Functionalism, at least as an antipode,
might be associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to provide public actors with greater
flexibility.”).
135 See Peretti, supra note 79, at 314 (“Not only was the outcome different in Brentwood Academy,
the Court there employed a much more flexible and fact-based approach.”).
136 Id. at 313-14 (There aren’t “compelling functional reasons to protect the NCAA from being
considered a state actor; there are numerous interdependencies between the state and the NCAA; and
UNLV appears to have delegated its authority to the NCAA.” Therefore, “[t]he Court was incorrect in
its 1988 Tarkanian ruling that the NCAA is not a state actor.”).
137 See Otto & Stippich, supra note 132, at 245.
138 See Collins, supra note 26 (“One camp of people ‘don’t agree with paying student-athletes and
argue,’ ‘[t]hey’re getting a free education, room, and board,’ ‘that’s all well and good,’ said Adam
Earnheardt,” chair of communications at Youngstown State University. ‘But, when you think about
130
131
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temporal standpoint. The NCAA currently has no cases set on the Supreme Court’s
docket.139 Additionally, the last antitrust appeal the Supreme Court received was from
the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon v. NCAA140 where the Court denied certiorari.141
Currently, it seems more likely that the Court will refrain from addressing this issue
and will leave it to be resolved through the democratic process. Many state legislatures
have shifted their focus to the issue and the Court’s recent denial of certiorari in
O’Bannon, coupled with the absence of any other cases addressing the issue, evinces
the Court’s reluctance to be the first to act on the matter.
B. Athletes as Employees
A seemingly straight forward proposal is to designate all athletes as employees
and simply pay them wages. This is not the first time the NCAA has faced this idea.142
But idealy, it should be the last.
One of the reasons courts often cite for denying student athletes employment
compensation is their acceptance of the amateurism ideology.143 However, in other
contexts, many courts have completely repudiated this fabricated ideal.144 So, why
accept it in this case? “The courts and the NLRB are two possible fora for the ultimate
determination of the viability of the tradition of amateurism in sports.”145 It is time for
one of these fora to make this change.
Unfortunately, it seems as if the NCAA will do anything but call the athletes
employees. Indeed, the effects of this would be monumental.146 That is no reason to shy
away from doing it. However, it just does not look to be possible. It simply goes against
every policy the NCAA has and would utterly ruin the amateurism and professionalism
divide it has been fighting to maintain.147 It is for this reason that the matter will not
be resolved in this way. The NCAA will never agree to pay the athletes directly.

how their talents and image are being used to potentially help their schools make multi-millions of
dollars, that just doesn’t equal out.’”).
139 2019-2020 Term, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019 (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
140 802 F.3d 1049, 1049-79 (9th Cir. 2015).
141 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 137 S. Ct. 277, 277 (2016).
142 See supra text accompanying note 44.
143 See Crabb, supra note 43, at 204 (“The NCAA did successfully get the Supreme Court in its
Board of Regents dicta to support the notion of this ‘revered tradition,’ which was in turn perpetuated
by the Seventh Circuit in the Berger case as the ‘long tradition of amateurism.’”).
144 Id. (“[Many courts have not] accepted the notion that the tradition is culturally significant to
the point that there is no room for change. For example, the NCAA and its member schools have seen
an erosion in the viability of the legal footing of amateurism in sports in antitrust cases like
O’Bannon.”).
145 Id.
146 See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 3, at 79 (“We understand that legal recognition of
some of these young men as ‘employees’ would carry profound implications for the NCAA, its member
schools, and the future of major college sports.”).
147 Amateurism And The Future Of The NCAA, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 39 (2013) (“If a university
is paying you to play, that’s a professional. To me that’s the drawing line, whether it’s a booster or the
university, paying you to play for them, that’s it. That violates amateurism.”).
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C. Endorsement Compensation
Perhaps the most plausible option is for the NCAA to allow athletes to profit off
their name, image, and likeness. “The debate rages because the NCAA does not allow
athletes to profit from their name, image and likeness. Ability to profit off those
qualities is basically a birthright to every other U.S. citizen.”148 There is no other
(unemployed) group of people one can find, in the United States, that is not allowed to
use their own image to profit.
1. Olympic Endorsement Model
The NCAA’s argument against the Olympic endorsement model, of course, is
amateurism. It tries to equate the student athletes with the regular students.149
However, that is not the problem. The problem is that all other students can partake
in almost any commercial endeavor they want.150 As Dr. Mark Nagel, an associate
director at the University of South Carolina said, “[t]he irony . . . is that if you looked
at just about any other student—and the NCAA claims that these players are just like
any other student—students do internships, students do part-time jobs, students start
YouTube channels.”151 Therefore, “[t]he idea . . . that . . . [they are] like any other
student, but they can’t engage in commerce, . . . is pretty ironic.”152 Simply put, the
NCAA’s stance is unfair and contradictory. If it can get past these baseless concerns,
it could potentially be a great resolution. Romagi Huma, the executive director of the
National Collegiate Players Association, agrees it would be beneficial to all. Huma
remarked, “[f]irst of all, the NCAA can get rid of a legal problem, and they can
simultaneously . . . get rid of a moral problem. The players can get rid of part of an
economic problem and an equal rights problem.”153

See Dodd, supra note 107.
See Piotrowicz, supra note 129 (“The NCAA previously has fought hard to maintain its
educational model, whereby it insists that athletes are just like every other college student.”).
150 Id. (“Other college students, however, face almost no restrictions to being paid while they are
students. Business majors can start companies, art students may sell their work, and journalism
students are encouraged to freelance.”).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
148
149
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V. CONCLUSION
A change needs to be made.154 And it is coming.155 The NCAA has itself stated that
there will be some sort of change within their system.156 Many people are skeptical,
however, about how serious the NCAA is taking it.157 Will it even result in much of a
change? Those same skeptics do not believe it will.158 Much of the skepticism is due to
the NCAA continuing to delay this process as much as possible.159 “Happily, however,
stall tactics are of limited utility against motivated adversaries with superior
power.”160 Stalling will not save them, because although they have a few years before
these bills would become law, the laws are coming. And it would be in their best
interest to come to a resolution before that, where it holds the power, on its own
terms.161

154 Tim Sullivan, As NCAA changes image, likeness rule, the delaying will go until government
intervenes,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
30,
2019,
11:20
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/10/30/ncaa-changes-names-image-likeness-ruleathletes-its-own-terms/4096410002/ (‘“There’s no question the legislative efforts in Congress and
various states has been a catalyst to change,’ NCAA President Mark Emmert stated . . . ‘It’s clear that
schools and the presidents are listening and have heard loud and clear that everyone agrees this is an
area that needs to be addressed.’”).
155 Id.
156 Ganesh Setty & Jabari Young, The NCAA will allow athletes to profit from their name, image
and likeness in a major shift for the organization, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/ncaaallows-athletes-to-be-compensated-for-names-images.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2019, 6:22 PM)
(“The NCAA is embracing ‘change’ and starting the process of allowing student-athletes to profit off
of their name, image and likeness, the organization announced Tuesday.”).
157 Billy Witz, NCAA Considers Loosening Rules for Athletes Seeking Outside Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-athletepay.html?emc=rss&partner=rss (“Nancy Skinner, a California state senator and an author of the bill
that was signed into law last month, said she was cautiously optimistic about the NCAA’s move. ‘The
devil is in the details,’ Skinner said . . . ‘We’ll have to see what the N.C.A.A. actually has in mind.’”).
158 See Sullivan, supra note 154 (“Shoved against the wall by legislation, lawsuits and evolving
public opinion, the NCAA would nonetheless have us think it is backing down out of benevolence. That
is not the case, however, as ‘[i]t is, of course, a crock.’ This is because the extent of their change is
unknown and they are ‘not doing so because of inalienable rights or because it’s the right thing to do
but because the organization’s heavy hand has been forced by the law, by lawmakers and by the
inexorable tide of history.’”).
159 Sullivan, supra note 154 (“Even now, as federal and state governments prod the organization
toward meaningful reforms, foot-dragging continues to frustrate measures that properly belong on
the fast track.”); see also Collins, supra note 26 (“Comments from the NCAA suggest that the
organization agrees, albeit grudgingly, with Gov[ernor] Newsom when he says that, ‘Reform is
coming.’ But it would prefer that change comes slowly.” The NCAA knows they cannot face this head
on, therefore, “‘[t]he NCAA's endgame is to slow this down because they can’t stop it over the long
haul with the way the winds are currently blowing,’ said David Carter, executive director of the
Marshall Sports Business Institute at the University of Southern California.”).
160 Sullivan, supra note 154.
161 Id. (“Should it fail to move fast or far enough, the NCAA would risk losing some of its selfgoverning authority to politicians.”); see also Dennis Dodd, NCAA seeks federal assistance from
Congress on name, image and likeness rules, CBS (Dec. 12, 2019, 5:00 pm),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-seeks-federal-assistance-from-congress-onname-image-and-likeness-rules/ (The good news, however, is that the NCAA and their officials are
beginning to take the matter more seriously. “NCAA president Mark Emmert told reporters
Wednesday that he had met with representatives of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate to
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The Olympic Model, or a model of similar form, is most appropriate. It not only
gives student athletes a way to make money on their own terms, but it also allows the
NCAA to maintain total control. It can regulate it how it deems fit and maintain the
role of boss where it can supervise everyone involved. More importantly, the NCAA
can still withhold its most prized possession, amateurism.162
Furthermore, and as an added bonus, the NCAA does not have to pay for it and
neither does its universities. “Given the billions its member schools generate through
sports, and that . . . payments would presumably come from third parties and not
university funds, this would be a bad time to misread the room.”163
With the government and media breathing down its neck, the NCAA should be
looking for a quick, and more importantly, a fair fix. Thus, it should implement a model
that is already established and successful. The Olympic Model is the best bet.

discuss federal legislation on name, image and likeness. That is significant because, for decades, the
NCAA has fought federal legislation on several fronts.”).
162 Sullivan, supra note 154 (“Tuesday’s unanimous vote to allow athletes’ [Name, Image, and
Likeness] rights was conditioned on those rights being exercised ‘in a manner consistent with the
collegiate model.’”); see also Setty & Young, supra note 156 (“The decision is a major shift for the
NCAA, which had historically been steadfast in prohibiting college athletes from being paid, in order
to preserve its amateurism rules.”).
163 Sullivan, supra note 154.

